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The European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP) is evolving into a concrete 
structure with a significantly improved means of projecting influence in the international 
environment.  Under the framework of ESDP, Europe has not only developed new military 
structures and capabilities; it is using them in small but significant missions.  Much has been 
written on the intricacies of those developments, their effects on the relations between 
members of the European Union and on the transatlantic relationship.
1 The purpose of this 
paper, however, is to return to a more fundamental question: why is the EU developing a 
capability to project power in the distinct absence of any significant military threat to 
Europe?   
International relations theory for the most part does not offer a good answer to this 
question.  Those in the offensive realist camp argue that states develop military power and the 
capability to influence international affairs through its use to balance the power of other states 
regardless of whether or not they pose a threat.
2  In this view, states seek to ensure their 
security by expanding their influence whenever they can do so.
3 They do not act reflexively, 
but rather exploit the opportunities presented by the international environment to their 
maximum advantage.
4 Others in the defensive realist camp claim that states engage in 
expansive behavior to counter specific threats.
5  When states perceive a threat to their 
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security, they seek to expand their capability to influence events beyond their borders.
6  
Within this framework states are seen as expanding their power only when necessary rather 
than when they can. 
But neither of those paradigms fully explains the development of ESDP.  The 
European Union (EU) has no ability to balance or even check the military power of the 
United States.  Even assuming all of the goals of ESDP were fulfilled, the deployable military 
power of the EU would be a fraction of that of the US Marine Corps, the smallest of the US 
Armed Forces.  The development of ESDP also fails to fit the defensive realist paradigm.  In 
fact, ESDP began to develop just as the Soviet Union—the one state that could actually pose 
a significant threat to Europe—was collapsing.  
Offensive realism, however, does offer a starting point: the EU is developing its 
power to influence international events because it can.  The post-Cold War international 
environment provides a unique opportunity since the beginning of the EU in which there is 
no military threat to Europe and the one remaining superpower is officially encouraging (with 
some ambivalence) the development of an independent European military capability.  But 
such developments take more than an opening in the international environment to bring them 
to fruition; they also require that the entity in question have the institutional ability to project 
power and influence.  This combination of realist international relations theory and domestic 
institutional development has been called state-centric realism.
7  
State-centric realism provides a more complete answer to the puzzle of why the EU is 
developing its capabilities to influence international events, including deployable military 
force at this particular juncture. Since the end of the Cold War, considerable governing 
authority and bureaucratic capacity has shifted to the EU from the member states.  This 
occurred contemporaneously with the end of the Cold War and the restrictions it placed on 
the development of a foreign and security policy independent from that of the United States. 
Thus, the European Union’s development of a greater capacity to influence events beyond its 
borders is the product of a permissive environment, but more importantly, it is also a product 
of its institutional development.  
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Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has progressively extracted powers from the 
national governments of its member states that are traditionally associated with sovereign 
states such as control over borders and the ability to mint currency.  It increasingly sets the 
regulations that govern the everyday life of European citizens over a range of health, safety 
and other issues.  After achieving a degree of authority over significant internal issues, it is 
now developing the means, including military power, to have a greater influence over the 
international environment.   
This is a familiar pattern in the development of states, and in some ways it parallels 
the history of the United States as the federal government became a more powerful institution 
relative to the individual states.
 8  Until the end of the nineteenth century, the United States 
featured relatively weak federal state institutions, including a presidency that was usually 
outmatched on foreign policy issues by the representatives of the member states, particularly 
in the Senate.  Despite its formidable economic power and size, the United States of the mid-
nineteenth century lacked the ability to project power and influence, in part because the 
individual states had little interest in creating a stronger federal authority at their  own 
expense. But following a series of changes that shifted increasingly more power to the federal 
government and the presidency in the 1890s, the United States rapidly began to develop the 
bureaucratic capability to effectively govern from the center and, in turn, developed its 
military and other capabilities to influence the international environment in the distinct 
absence of any territorial threat.   
In short, the United States became a significant power because it could.  The lack of a 
threat in the late nineteenth century provided an opportunity, but the state had to develop 
institutions capable of channelling resources to the expanding interests of the federal 
government. It was the process of transferring power from the individual states to the central 
government that allowed the US to go from global weakling to global power in a short period 
of time at the end of the nineteenth century. 
But can we use a similar framework to think about the current European effort to 
become a global player in its own right?  Clearly direct comparisons to the US can be 
misleading, but there is no denying that the power amassed by the EU over the past two 
decades puts its capacity to govern well beyond the reach of any international organization.  
 
8 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 
the Present (New York: Random House, 1987).   5
                                                
It may not be evolving into a state in the Westphalian sense, but it is certainly extracting 
many of the powers and attributes traditionally associated with the state.  
Furthermore, if this is a convincing framework, then what are the implications for the 
United States and for transatlantic alliance?  At one level we may see increased competition 
between the US and Europe as Europe becomes increasing able to use military power as part 
of its effort to exert an independent influence in global affairs.  Although the EU does not 
have the capacity or desire to balance against the US in a classic military sense, it may be 
able to use its new capabilities to exercise greater influence over US actions.  As Barry Posen 
notes, it is possible that the credible promise of an EU intervention in some areas not 
considered part of the NATO ambit might force the US to support a NATO mission there 
solely to prevent a successful independent EU intervention that would raise questions as to 
the necessity of the transatlantic alliance.
9
At another level, however, the United States and a more internationally engaged EU 
may become partners with increasingly similar perceptions regarding threats to their security 
and the use of military power in international affairs.  From a realist perspective, power tends 
to shape interests, and the lack of power has led to a more pacifist Europe.
10 But would a 
more powerful Europe perceive its interests differently and use the tools at its disposal to 
pursue them?  Borrowing Robert Kagan’s terminology, would the ‘”Venus and Mars” 
identities meet, appropriately enough, at Earth?  Furthermore, if the European preference for 
multilateralism and legalism is a product of the fact that it cannot independently play a large 
role in international security affairs, then will that preference change as the EU acquires more 
autonomous power? This is of course purely speculative, but if a state-centric realist approach 
explains the development of ESDP, it may also be a reliable guide for the broader 
implications of its successful realization.  
Finally, it is worth considering the effects of ESDP on the development of the EU. It 
is possible to have a complex process of consultation between member states and the EU 
institutions on a range of issues that, while significant, are not immediate crises.  But adding 
a hard security dimension to the EU means that some matters may need rapid and firm action 
requiring a streamlined and centralized decision-making process.  Thus, the further 
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development of ESDP may have a reflexive effect on the EU, pushing it to shift more 
decision-making power to Brussels.
 11  
This paper begins with an examination of the rise of the United States to demonstrate 
the importance of institutional capability on the development of power projection capabilities 
as part of a strategy for gaining greater international influence.  Second, it argues that the EU 
can be viewed through a similar lens because it has adopted many of the characteristics 
traditionally associated with states and is progressively extracting sovereignty from the 
member states.  Third, it details the growth of ESDP and other tools of power projection.  
Finally, it considers the implications for the transatlantic relationship and the development of 
the EU. 
 
State-Centric Realism and the Rise of the United States 
The United States experienced a massive transition in the forty years after the end of 
the Civil War. In both relative and absolute terms, the United States economy boomed in the 
decades after the Civil War, several depressions notwithstanding.  Between 1865 and 1898, 
agricultural production grew by more than 200 percent, coal production by 800 percent, and 
railway track construction by close to 600 percent. 
12  The population doubled between 1865 
and 1900 as wave after wave of European immigrants moved to the United States.  By 1885, 
the US passed Great Britain as the single largest manufacturer.
13  In relative terms, the 
growth of the United States during this period is even more striking.  The US was growing at 
a rate of approximately 5 percent per year compared to 1.5 percent for Great Britain.  
Yet, despite this extraordinary growth relative to other states, the US remained a bit 
player in international affairs. The Department of State was miniscule and diplomatic 
representation was generally limited to honorary consuls and a handful of true diplomatic 
postings.
14  Other states limited their representation to the United States, sometimes shutting 
embassies in what was regarded as the diplomatic backwater of Washington, DC.  Most states 
did not bother to send their best diplomats, in fact until 1892 there were no foreign 
representatives of ambassadorial rank in the United States.
15   
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The US military was similarly limited in the thirty years following the Civil War.  The 
navy, the main tool of power projection at the time, was a fraction of the size of European 
powers with smaller economies.
16  The US Army was even less significant with an 
authorized end strength of 27,000 that was in practice considerably less.  Enlisted men were 
poorly paid and desertion rates were high: nearly one-third of the Army deserted in 1871.
 17  
Much of the military strength of the United States was in the hands of the individual states, 
which provided militias of generally poor quality and training to national efforts. 
Yet, by the first decade of the twentieth century, the situation was radically different.  
The United States had defeated Spain in the Spanish-American war, taking possession of 
strategic islands and coaling stations from the Pacific to the Caribbean in rapid succession.  
The United States Navy had been transformed from one so minor that it was on the receiving 
end of Oscar Wilde’s wit to being one of the most modern and potent in the world.
18  The 
United States was no longer a bit player international affairs as demonstrated by the role it 
played in ending the Russo-Japanese War, and this was only a precursor to the decisive role 
the United States would play in ending World War I and shaping the subsequent map of 
Europe.  In a span of less than forty years, the United States was transformed from a minor 
player outside of its immediate region into a significant global actor. 
This transformation took place in part because of the massive expansion of the 
American economy following the Civil War. Many observers at the time expected that the 
United States would become a major power in global affairs in the 1870s.  Benjamin Disraeli 
predicted that the outcome of the Civil War would be, “a different America from that which 
was known to our fathers and even from that which this generation has had so much 
experience. It will be an America of armies, of diplomacy… and probably of frequent 
wars.”
19  Although Britain was most concerned about the emergence of a potential rival and a 
new naval power, other European states also believed that they could expect the United States 
to play a significantly larger role in international affairs. 
Yet, it took nearly thirty additional years for the United States to begin to fulfil those 
predictions.  Disraeli was correct in his analysis; the United States had the material power to 
become a major player in international affairs in the 1870s and 1880s.  But it failed to live up 
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to its predicted role because it lacked the institutional capacity in the federal government to 
harness the nation’s strength for expanding its interests in global affairs until the end of the 
century.   A series of changes between 1865 and 1900, however, gradually shifted power 
away from the individual states to the federal government.  At the same time power also 
shifted within Washington from the legislative to the executive branch.  This combination of 
events created a central government that was not only more capable of extracting resources, 
but more importantly, capable of using them in the interests of the national government.   
The Centralization of Power in the United States 
It is often assumed that the United States of the twentieth century is simply an 
expanded version of what existed previously, but the strength of the federal government and 
the presidency is a relatively new phenomenon in the history of the nation.
20  Throughout 
most of the nineteenth century it was clear that the bulk of power rested in the individual 
states and their representatives in the Congress. The federal government was one with only, 
“a token administrative presence in most of the nation … whose sovereignty was interpreted 
by the central administration as contingent on the consent of the individual states.”
21    The 
Senate, which had a particularly powerful influence over foreign policy, was designed to give 
equal representation to the individual states.  Until 1913 Senators were elected by the 
individual state legislatures, which made them very much the representatives of their state’s 
interest rather than the broader national interest.  The Senate used its prerogatives to the full 
extent, leading Henry Adams to quip that the United States had a government, “of the people, 
by the people, for the Senate.”
22
The power of the Congress and relative weakness of the executive branch led 
Woodrow Wilson to write Congressional Government in 1885, in which he argued that the 
Congress was the supreme governing body in the American system, but that it lacked the 
ability to function effectively.  He proposed creating a cabinet within the Congress that would 
function as an executive and relegate the president to essentially the role of Head of State. 
Wilson himself later acknowledged his errors (particularly when he became president), but 
when he first wrote Congressional Government it was an accurate depiction of the United 
States for much of the preceding century.  The Congress was far more powerful than the 
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executive branch, which lacked the staff, funding and administrative capacity to govern 
effectively.  The individual states had considerably more authority and autonomy in the 
1870s and 1880s than they would have at the turn of the century.  States controlled much of 
the regulatory structure that existed and the federal government did not gain control over 
immigration until 1882.
23  The Congress was dominant in most areas and the individual 
bureaucracies of the federal government were in practice responsible to the Congressional 
committees rather than the president.  This extended into foreign affairs to the point that 
British diplomats in the 1870s were convinced that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee was the director of foreign policy in the United States, not the Secretary 
of State.
24  Given the state of affairs, this was a reasonable conclusion. 
The states through their representatives in the Senate were able to frustrate most plans 
of the executive to use the material power of the United States to play a larger role in 
international affairs in the 1870s and 1880s.  Throughout the period immediately following 
the Civil War, the Senate simply refused to take under consideration treaties that would have 
expanded the reach and influence of the United States such as the treaty for the annexation of 
the Danish West Indies.  The Senate rejected outright the Reciprocation Treaty with Hawaii, 
which was seen as a first step towards annexation.  Many other accords, treaties and trade 
agreements that would have extended the influence of the United States died in the Senate or 
were never submitted for approval because of the certainty of a Senate rejection.
25   
Part of this was owed to the Congressional reluctance to assume the expense of 
expansion, but much of it was tied to the ongoing battles between the states and the executive 
for authority over domestic affairs. Greater involvement in foreign affairs would necessarily 
increase the power of the federal government relative to the individual states.  Becoming 
embroiled in world affairs was consistently opposed by many in the United States because it 
was feared that would necessitate a large standing military and, in turn, increased taxes and 
demands on the citizens and individual states.
26 This concern articulated by Thomas Jefferson 
and others in the earliest days of the republic was a constant in American political discourse 
and it was particularly salient in the aftermath of the Civil War and the military occupation of 
the South that followed in the 1870s.  It should be remembered that one-third of the states in 
this period had fought to dissolve the union and were only readmitted between 1866 and 
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1870.   Even after the Civil War and reconstruction, “states’ rights” remained the rallying cry 
for blocking the expansion of federal power in the South well into the twentieth century. 
The balance of power, however, between the states and Congress on the one hand, 
and the federal government and the executive branch on the other, began to shift rapidly with 
a series of reforms begun in the 1880s.  Those changes occurred in response to the rapid 
industrialization of the country.  In particular, the rapid growth of the railways created a 
continental market for goods that required national level regulation.  The expansion of the rail 
system was subsidized by the federal government, and with subsidization came government 
regulation.
27  The Supreme Court strengthened the idea of federal supremacy over interstate 
commerce and the railroads when it ruled repeatedly in this period that the federal 
government had responsibility for the regulation of interstate business. 
Rapid industrialization also led to the birth of the federal agencies such as the Civil 
Service Commission in 1883, the Bureau of Labor in 1884 and the Interstate Commerce 
Commission in 1887. At the same time, the rapid growth in cities required new forms of 
regulation over the new technologies providing public services over large areas such as gas, 
electricity and telecommunications.  Reformers of the time successfully campaigned to 
expand the power of the federal government to regulate an increasing large number of issues 
such as health and safety standards that had previously been in the hands of the individual 
states or local authorities.
28 This led to the creation of new bureaucracies under the control of 
the central governing authority that gradually gained the expertise and competency to expand 
its powers at the expense of the sovereignty of the individual member states. This power was 
centralized in the executive branch because most reformers at the time saw the Congress as 
too incompetent and parochial to cope with such challenges in a effective manner.
29  
This broad centralization of authority built up new bureaucracies that made the 
executive the head of a growing, and more powerful administrative apparatus.  A need for 
efficient central control less oriented around the patronage politics that dominated 
Congressional appointments to the bureaucracy led to a series of reforms designed to create 
more professional institutions.  In turn, institutions such as the Civil Service Commission and 
the Presidential Commission on Economy and Efficiency became, “visible symbols not only 
of a transfer of initiative for administrative reform from the legislative to the executive 
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branch, but also of the tipping of the constitutional balance from Congress to the 
President.”
30
   Civil service reform was a particularly significant development. The drive to create 
more efficient institutions led to competitive exams and other processes that resulted in 
increasing numbers of competent civil servants filling positions that were previously 
occupied by individuals whose main qualifications were close ties to a political party or 
member of congress.  All of this started as a means to cope with the domestic challenges of 
industrialization, but it soon spilled over into international affairs as successful reforms of 
domestic bureaucratic institutions prompted a re-evaluation of the State Department and the 
military. The American diplomatic corps in the nineteenth century was a source of more 
embarrassment that diplomatic achievement.  In the 1870s the American minister to Ecuador 
attempted to kill the British ambassador, while the American representative in Tokyo amused 
himself by careening through the streets in a carriage and terrifying pedestrians with cracks of 
his bullwhip.
31  But starting in the 1880s, the State Department began to become an 
increasingly more professional organization whose consuls and secretaries were the product 
of exams and merit-based promotions.  Although many top-level postings remained political 
appointments, the most important officers just below them were now competent professionals 
whose number doubled in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.
32
The civil service reform process also drove some to consider how the military could 
be managed more efficiently.  The militia-based system was increasingly seen in the late 
nineteenth century as chaotic and inefficient.  There were few clear lines of responsibility and 
the chiefs of the separate army and navy bureaus had independent relationships with 
Congress to the extent that, “in peacetime, even the President’s authority over the armed 
forces took a second place to these horizontal relationships.”
33  Sweeping reforms proved 
impossible to implement because the states were determined to retain their control over the 
militias, but a professional military education system and naval intelligence office were 
established in the 1880s.  Competitive examinations for the promotion of officers introduced 
in the same period helped to establish a professional officer corps, and the bureaucracy 
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expanded to include new Assistant Secretary positions in the Department of War and the 
Department of the Navy.   
 Thus, the process of centralizing authority to better cope with domestic challenges 
ultimately gave the executive branch the authority and bureaucratic resources to develop 
improved tools of exerting more influence over international affairs as well. The central state 
could extract more resources, and the federal budget more than doubled between 1877 and 
1900.
34  More importantly, however, it could use those resources to expand the international 
influence of the United States because the more centralized and capable administrative 
structure allowed it to respond more effectively to international opportunities and pressures.   
  Once this process of centralizing power in the federal government and in the 
executive was firmly ensconced, the United States began to develop a power projection 
capability that reflected its economic strength.  The navy was expanded dramatically at the 
end of the nineteenth century. What was a low-to-middling power projection force at best 
during the 1880s became the third largest in the world at the start of the twentieth century.
35  
It is important to note that this took place in the distinct absence of any serious threat to the 
United States.  Relations with Britain were significantly better than they had been in recent 
memory, and no other European power with the exception of Spain held significant overseas 
territory close to the United States.  Analysts at the time were well aware of this and 
advocated a larger navy not to defend against a specific threat, but rather as a part of 
assuming the United State’s rightful place as a world power with military might that reflected 
its economic strength.  As one popular journal of the time stated, “We need to be armed to be 
a great Power.”
36
As the state became more centralized and the tools of power projection were 
developed, that power was used in a variety of ways to expand American influence in the 
international environment. American foreign policy became much more assertive over the 
course of the 1890s.  Zakaria’s study of the period reveals that the United States seized 78 
percent of the opportunities to expand its influence between 1889 and 1908. But between 
1865 and1889 it only took 27 percent of those opportunities.
37  The expansion of American 
influence did not rely solely or even primarily on military interventions; the United States 
began to play a larger role in diplomacy, international conferences and treaties, a role that 
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was previously hampered by a strong Congress that reflected the more restricted interests of 
the individual states.  The same United States that was absent from international negotiations 
in the 1870s was now playing a central role in ending border disputes between Britain and 
Venezuela, securing a route for the Panama Canal, negotiating with the European powers in 
naval conferences, and guaranteeing western trading interests in Asia by the end of the 
century.    
American leaders clearly had a desire to play a larger role in the international arena 
and to develop the ability to project power before the 1890s.  The country was also 
internationally recognized as having the material wealth and power to take on that role. 
Presidents and Secretaries of State attempted to expand the reach of the United States in the 
decades following the Civil War, and the massive expansion of the navy in the 1890s was 
preceded by several attempts to give the United States a navy that reflected its economic and 
territorial strength.  Yet, those previous attempts to do so failed when blocked by the 
representatives of the individual states in the Congress.  It took the emergence of a more 
potent federal government and a strengthened executive relative to the legislature to allow the 
United States to pursue a broader conception of its interests abroad.   But that strengthened 
central authority emerged in response to the need to develop better regulatory structures for 
the increasingly interconnected continent-wide market of the United States, not in response to 
an external threat.  In broad strokes this pattern should be familiar to students of the European 
Union. 
Applying State-Centric Realism to the European Union 
Although state-centric realism offers an explanation of why and when the United 
States expanded its role in global affairs, does this framework apply to the EU, which, of 
course, is not a state?  There is a healthy academic debate over what exactly the EU is and 
how to compare with other institutions.  Although it is clear that it has expanded well beyond 
the realm of any other international organization, many scholars maintain that it lacks many 
of the key features of a state and that explicit comparisons as such are unwarranted.
38 Others 
insist that it is sui generis or a post-modern state that defies comparison. 
39    
Yet, neither of those approaches is particularly productive for further comparative 
analysis.  It is true that the EU lacks powers associated with modern governance, but this 
critique could be applied to other states at different times in their history.  The EU has no 
                                                  
38  
39    14
                                                
direct power to tax the citizenry, for example, but neither did the United States federal 
government until World War I. On the other hand, labelling the EU sui generis effectively 
shuts down comparative analysis and restricts study and discussion of the EU to describing its 
unique features rather than trying to better understand it in a comparative context. 
A more productive path might be to focus on the state-like institutions the EU has 
developed over the past two decades and consider the implications for further integration on 
security and defense issues in the coming decades.  Few would have been willing to predict 
in the early 1980s that the EU would have a common currency in twenty years time that 
would not only hold its own against the dollar, but also challenge it as a major reserve 
currency.  We should not, therefore, dismiss the direction and progress of European 
integration on defence and security matters as something doomed to founder on the 
immutable rocks of national sovereignty. 
Nonetheless, there is a clear difference between the “low politics” of domestic 
regulation and economic affairs and the “high politics” of security and foreign affairs, which 
is explicitly recognized by the pillar structure of the European Union.  From a traditional 
realist perspective that informs the intergovernmental approach to the EU, the member states 
should not be expected to surrender more sovereignty over high politics because the areas of 
security and foreign affairs are tied to the core concepts of what defines the national interest.  
The EU has no “national interest” by definition; therefore, high politics is expected to remain 
firmly in the province of the decision-making authority of the member states.
40   
But it should be noted that most of the member states already have surrendered some 
sovereignty over issues that affect their core ability to function as independent actors in the 
international environment, including issues that touch on fundamental aspects of national 
sovereignty and national security.
41 The adoption of the Euro, for example, represents a 
massive transfer of national sovereignty from the member states to the EU, encompassing the 
ability to set interest rates and manipulate national currencies.  Those rights had been 
gradually constrained by exchange rate mechanisms for decades, but the introduction of the 
Euro formally transferred this power to the European Central Bank.  In addition, national 
budgets and the ability to run deficits are constrained by the (admittedly much violated) 
growth and stability pact.   
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The Schengen agreement that allows for free movement across borders represents 
another significant transfer of national sovereignty to the European Union that impinges on 
national security. Control of the national territory and borders is a key defining point of 
national sovereignty.  Yet, in much of Europe the national governments have relinquished the 
power to scrutinize who and what enters their country if it comes from another EU member 
state. It is true that Italian customs and immigration authorities, for example, still control who 
and what enters Italy from outside the EU, but what enables a system where Germany accepts 
the Italian level of scrutiny as sufficient is a common framework set at the EU level.   
The implications of this transfer of national sovereignty are far-reaching.  It is not too 
far a step to imagine, for example, a common customs and immigration police force at some 
point in the future.  In fact, there is already some movement in this direction with the creation 
of FRONTEX in 2004, an EU body that coordinates border security among the members and 
promotes the development of integrated border security. FRONTEX has an operational aspect 
and manages the European Patrol Network that monitors the southern maritime frontier.  It is 
also responsible for establishing agreements and memorandums of understand with third 
party countries on controlling illegal immigration.
42 Although it is still a nascent institution, 
the growth of FRONTEX could be a significant step forward in the EU’s growing power over 
issues that blur the line between high and low politics. 
On a more pedestrian level, most legislation dealing with health, safety and workplace 
regulation is now crafted at the EU level and implemented at the national level.  There is 
considerable leeway in how the national governments choose to implement the legislation, 
but the EU has, and increasingly uses, its ability to enforce its will over a range of policy 
issues.
43
Thus, the member states have progressively transferred power to the EU over a range 
of issues that have traditionally defined sovereignty:  the ability to mint currency, set national 
monetary policy, determine who and what enters the national territory and how and what law 
will apply to its citizens on a range of issues that affect daily life.  Just as importantly, 
however, the EU is developing effective institutions to use that power, although not yet in the 
realm of “high politics.”  But this is precisely the point at which the development of the EU 
parallels the emergence of the United States as a more significant actor in the international 
arena.  The need to regulate markets and standardize regulations across the American 
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continent led to an accretion of power at the level of the federal government, particularly the 
executive branch and its administrative agencies.  But the process of creating more efficient 
administrative structures for domestic affairs soon spilled into the State Department and the 
military, making them more capable as well.  This rendered the central government more 
capable of expanding its influence in the international environment, in part through the 
acquisition of the tools of power projection.   In the 1870s, foreign policy decisions in the 
United States were more often than not made by the representatives of the individual states in 
the Senate.  But that control over high politics was gradually transferred to the president and 
the executive agencies after they acquired increased power over domestic regulatory affairs.   
There has been something of a similar process of development in EU institutions and 
more effective decision-making structures since the Single European Act of 1986.
44  The 
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice summits have all created new bureaucratic structures and 
expanded the breath and depth of expertise within the EU bureaucracy.  At the same time, 
more efficient decision-making structures such as Qualified Majority Voting and constructive 
abstentionism have been introduced.  This has been done mainly to cope with the challenges 
of integrating the European common market, but the separation between high and low politics 
is not always a clear line.  The Schengen agreement, for example, was originally oriented 
around facilitating the movement of goods across the common economic space.  But as noted 
above, it begins to impinge on the sovereignty and independence of the member states in the 
realm of high politics.  As the European Security Strategy states, the main threats today are 
generally seen to be emanating from transnational terrorist organizations and criminal 
syndicates.
45 Determining who and what enters the national territory is a vital component of 
guarding against this threat, and decisions about this are increasingly formed at the EU level. 
This is not to say that the EU is going to become anything resembling what might be 
called a Westphalian state, but the concepts of state and sovereignty should be thought of 
along a continuum rather than in absolute terms.  There are different types of states, and 
sovereignty is rarely absolute.  States often allow infringements on their sovereignty through 
treaties, international obligations and conventions.
46  We should also consider that the terms 
“state” and “government” are not synonymous.  While the EU may have a relatively small 
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bureaucratic structure and resources compared to the member states, it increasingly provides 
the structure of governance and rule in society.
47   
Regardless of the degree to which it does or does not resemble the model of the 
Westphalian state, the EU is increasingly extending its governance over issues that 
traditionally define national sovereignty.  There are many unique aspects of the European 
Union, but that does not erase the fact that the EU has evolved into an entity about which we 
can make analytical comparisons with other actors in the international system. 
What is striking, however, is that the EU began to develop the European Security and 
Defence Strategy shortly after consolidating significantly increased authority over a range of 
issues related to internal regulation as well as developing the institutional mechanisms to use 
that authority.  In more than in a few ways, this parallels the United States development of 
military power in the wake of its centralization of power over domestic affairs in the federal 
government and the executive at the end of the nineteenth century. 
 
ESDP: From Nothing to Something 
  The development of ESDP from raw idea to burgeoning institution in a very brief 
period is impressive given the weight of the issues and the generally pace of developments in 
the EU.  ESDP became a concrete issue at the Maastricht summit in 1993, and observers at 
the time thought that the idea was something to be realized only well into the future.
48  Yet in 
the intervening years, and particularly since 1998, ESDP began to crystallize with increasing 
speed.  It now has a permanent bureaucracy in the form of the EU military committee and 
military staff, a framework for conducting operations and securing force goals from the 
member states, the beginnings of an agency for defence and armaments co-operation, and a 
security strategy that puts forth the political mechanisms and conceptual reasons for how and 
when this force would be used.     
  The EU is not just developing the institutional mechanisms; it is using them in small but 
significant operations in the Balkans and Africa. The EU has conducted three operations within 
the context of ESDP.  Two of them - the mission in the Republic of Macedonia (Operation 
Concordia) and the police mission in Bosnia - were conducted within the Berlin Plus framework 
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that spells out the mechanisms for co-operation between the EU and NATO.  The operation in 
the Congo (Operation Artemis) was conducted without reference to Berlin Plus.   
  What is apparent from those missions is that European military resources are stretched 
to provide the forces and logistical support for those limited operations. Yet, there are signs 
that European militaries are developing the ability to deploy and sustain small military forces 
in challenging environments.  Progress in strategic air and sea lift could give European 
militaries the ability to move their forces with less direct support from the US by 2012.  
Recent lease agreements to use Ukrainian Antonov 124-100 commercial aircraft, and the 
collective purchase of several American C-17 military transport aircraft grant European 
militaries considerable reach well before then.
   European countries are also investing 
considerable amounts into Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. 
49 If properly leveraged, those 
developments could allow European states as individuals, or the EU as a collective, to project 
a larger amount of sustainable military force in the near future. 
The flat nature of most European defense budgets has led many analysts to conclude 
that there is simply not enough funding to sustain procurement programs and develop more 
robust deployable forces. 
50 Although it is true that many countries in Europe spend less than 
2 percent of GDP on defense, there is mild trend in shifting expenditures to equipment 
procurement from other budget accounts.  After falling to an average of 13% for much of the 
post-Cold War period, the percentage of defense spending devoted to equipment purchases 
has rebounded to just over 15%.  This is close to the 1985-1989 average of 15.5%.
51   
In addition, European militaries are taking advantage of asset sharing arrangements 
that could lead to considerably more coordinated capability in strategic lift (air and sea 
transportation of military equipment and personnel) without significantly larger expenditures. 
Strategic lift is a critical test case for asset sharing, and there are some encouraging signs of 
progress. Seaborne transport is particularly important because the majority of military 
equipment is transported by sea given its weight and volume. The outlook is good for 
strategic sealift, not the least because of the oversupply of commercial shipping capacity in 
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the global market and the willingness of the commercial sector to enter into contracts to 
supply sealift to the military.  Eight EU members are participating in a strategic sealift group, 
and aim to have ten ships (mainly roll-on/roll-off) available for operations on a mix of 
assured access and full-time charter contracts.
52   The sealift group currently has arranged 
assured access to three ships, including one Norwegian and two Danish roll-on/roll-off ships, 
and the residual capacity is four of the UK's roll-on/roll-off ships.  
This is closely tied to the better co-ordination of sealift through the Sealift Co-
ordination Centre at Windhaven, the Netherlands, which arranges for ships that would 
otherwise be traveling empty or only partially loaded on return trips to carry the material of 
other partner countries.  For example, an empty UK vessel returning from the Persian Gulf 
was used to carry Dutch air defense equipment, saving both countries about 500,000 euros 
each.
53  Those savings of a few million euros per year are only a tiny fraction of the 
approximately 193 billion euros that Europe spends annually on defense, but the sealift co-
ordination program represents a commitment by European militaries to do more to rationalize 
their defense expenditures and avoid unnecessary duplication. 
Another cooperative project that is showing some signs of initial success is the 
European Airlift Co-ordination Centre in Eindhoven, the Netherlands.   This centre co-
ordinates the airlift and refueling assets of Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, 
France and the Netherlands.   The center costs approximately 200,000 euros per year to 
operate, but has saved participating nations many times more than that already by 
consolidating cargo and preventing many empty return flights.  Its initial success has led to a 
combined approach for air and sealift operations that could maximize the utility of all 
strategic transportation equipment.  
  Beyond those military advances, there are a number of other developments that 
could enable the EU to play a comprehensive role in security affairs and allow it to fill the 
critical gap between military and civilian capabilities.  Several European countries have 
deployable paramilitary police forces that are in many ways a mixture of light infantry and a 
police force.  They are trained for police activities in a way that almost no military personnel 
are, but they are relatively heavily armed compared to any police force and can be fitted into 
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a military chain of command.  Such forces can be vital in stabilization operations that require 
this mix of skills and training. 
  Recent developments could make European paramilitary forces very relevant to 
likely future missions. The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) was created in 2004 with the 
participation of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and The Netherlands.
 54  The five contributing 
member states have already announced that the EGF could be available to other international 
organizations and, although it is not an EU structure, all of the contributing states are EU 
members.   It is still a small force, but it could serve as a prototype for the sort of force most 
needed in situations where traditional military units might be inappropriate. In addition to this 
force, the EU is building a 5,000-strong civilian police force of which some 1000 are to be 
deployable on 30 days notice.
55  The combination of those two forces when combined with 
advances in strategic lift could enable the EU to play a significantly larger independent role 
in stabilization operations in the near future. 
  The developments outlined above should not be interpreted as an attempt to build a 
“European army” but they do represent an adaptive response to demonstrated shortfalls 
within realistic budgetary constraints.  Although many analysts have focused on the top-line 
numbers of European defense budgets and concluded that little has changed in recent years,  a 
more detailed look shows that there is some progress in using available resources in a more 
cost-effective and militarily efficient manner. 
   
Implications for the Future 
From a realist perspective it is a relatively short step to conclude that the development 
of more robust independent power projection capability by the EU will lead to increased 
friction with the United States.  With the Cold War long over, Europe no longer needs the 
American security guarantee and is free to develop and implement a security policy 
completely independent from the transatlantic relationship. As the EU becomes an 
increasingly coherent political entity, it will seek to exert its will in the global environment.  
For a traditional realist, this can only lead to increased competition with the US for influence 
over international events.   
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  At the same time, however, an increasingly powerful and proactive EU in the 
international security arena may acquire expanded interests and an expanded threat 
perception more similar to that of the United States.  EU interventions in parts of Africa or 
the Middle East, however well-intentioned, would be perceived in hostile terms in some 
quarters, particularly radical Islamist circles.  European and American threat perceptions 
could rapidly converge as an increasingly capable EU takes on missions in troubled regions 
of the world where their actions will clash with the goals of Islamist extremists. 
Beyond the Transatlantic relationship, the development of ESDP may have reflexive 
effects on the EU itself.  If interests expand with capabilities, then it is likely that the EU’s 
interests will grow to take on progressively larger and more difficult missions under ESDP.  
Some of those will inevitably require rapid decisions, which could be a driver for more 
streamlined decision-making structures in the EU. 
The nature of the security challenges may also tend to push more decision-making 
regarding security issues toward the EU. The increase in the number of relevant security 
actors- private security companies, non-governmental organizations, charities, police and 
paramilitary police- needed to address the challenges outlined in the European Security 
Strategy presents a challenge of governance.  Rather than a purely national and hierarchical 
structure, a more “heterarchical” structure allowing inputs from a range of actors becomes 
more relevant.
56  This complexity may create a perceived need for coordination at a 
European-wide level and thus push more coordinating authority toward the EU. 
  Regardless of the implications for the future, the relative rapid progress of ESDP in 
the absence of a military threat to Europe begs the question of “why now?”  The short answer 
is that the EU has the ability to do so now because of a permissive international environment 
and internal developments that render it more capable of projecting power to gain greater 
influence over international events.  Doing so does not require deployable military force of 
anything approaching that of the US military.  In fact, given the wide array of stabilization 
missions that are likely to feature prominently in the coming decades, the EU could be an 
influential contributor to global security through the development of relatively small numbers 
of deployable military units in combination with specialized paramilitary forces.  
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